The ‘Manevr’ Tactical Level Automated Control System: 30 Years Later
Originally published in Arsenal, vol. 5, 2011.
Translated by Microbalrog
Article courtesy of Otvaga.
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A vehicle of the Beta-3M Central Computing Complex during a field exercise.

One chief tasks carried out by the Science and Research Institute of Automation Tools since the 1960′s was the creation of the complex of tactical-level automation means “Manever”. This work was carried out in under orders #686-252 from 02.09.1968 and #612-191 from 24.08.1973 from the Soviet Cabinet of Minister. The “Manevr” C&C system was adopted in 1982. Nearly 30 years have passed since…

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Yuri Ivanovich Mosienko – Director of AGAT Control Systems Inc., head C&C system designer for the Belarussian Armed Forces

The chief designer for the system was Major-General Yuri Podrezov, head of the Institute. Another great contributor was the head of the department, Doctor of Technical Sciences R. P Nikolaev, who was justly seen as the main ideologue and inspiration behind the system. System development and architecture for the tactical-level command complex was done under his direct oversight.

All work has been carried out in cooperation with the leading institutions of the Ministries for Radio Industry, Defense Industry, and the scientific-military institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

These joint efforts have allowed the creation of a system answering the most modern requirements of command and control and highest possible specifications, with no analogues world-wide. The complex was capable of working on the move, allowing impovements in operational response and command quality in combat. No foreign C&C system at the time could do that.

The mobile tactical-level complex is one of the key parts of “Manevr” and is a multi-level, hierarchic structure of force and weapons-control means, present on the division, regimental, and battalion level of command, as part of several interlinked subsystems of command and control.

The combined arms’ subsystem included:

  • Headquarters and command subsystem
  • Reconnaissance command subsystem.
  • Chemical forces control subsystem
  • Aviation battle control subsystem

The C&C system includes also the rocket forces and artillery control subsystem and the Air Defense subsystem.

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The tactical level of “Manever”

When the tactical command system was created, an end-to-end process was first applied to creating a large integrated system. This methodology was based on a systemic approach from the formal representation of the object area in the form of a mathematical model to its full realization in the technological, linguistic, informational and software levels.

The specialists have developed a new System Programming Language, comprising a joint system of syntax for all “Manevr” subsystems for extra compatibility between the subsystems and with other connected objects and upper-level systems.

The division and regimental level links of the system were created by a team under Kuritzyn I.V., a Candidate of Technical Scientists, who was a chief designer for the division and regimental HQ. For the division level HQ, command vehicles MP21 (chief designer Lisitsyn), based on the MTLB-U and MP31 (chiev designer Tsarev), based on the BMP-1KSh, were created. Modifications were made later for various division and regimental officers.

The vehicles had modern computing means, including a command input keyboard, a small-scale graphic information input/output device, an alphabet/digital display, an onboard computer (Argon-1, later Argon-1M or “Uhlan”) and a documenting device, a multi-channel transmitter (“Basalt”, later “Redut”), an ultra-short-wave and shortwave radio station and communications complex, as well as navigation and observation tools.

The information and calculation process of the system were carried out using a “Ritm-10” central computing complex, later replaced with a more modern “Beta-3M” and designed to support the work of mobile command posts. The “Beta-3M” utilized an A-40 processor (“Ryad-1M” computer), an external 640kb memory device, as well as a 600kb ZUML-75 magnetic tape, and a documentic device. The complex was also linked to transmitters and ultra-shortwave stations similar to those on command vehicles.

The main purpose of the “Beta-3M” was solving operational and tactical command and control tasks during planning and execution stages of combat operations and automatic distribution of the decisions made to the division and regimental command posts. The communications system used was based on modern tools guaranteeing reliable communications both in static positions and on the move, including internal communications in the command posts, among command posts of the division and regiment, with upper-level command posts and linked objects. Encryption equipment of guaranteed security classes was used to protect the data. The equipment and organization of the communications guaranteed data transmissions in all combat conditions, including active and passive interference, ionizing radiation, ECM, etc. The system was controlled from the communications officers’ command vehicle, from which he was able to alter the communications architecture and address/route networks, to establish redundancy and alternative pathways in order to guarantee the transfer of information to figures of authority in battle conditions.

In the late 1970-’s – early 1980′s representatives of the State ordering body, the main contractors and the military-scientific team have participated in successful testing of the tactical C&C system as well as a range of headquarters and field exercising in which the complexes were used.

At the final stage, “Manevr” was tested in the armed forces in the largest training exercises in the Belarussian Military District “Zapad-81” where the system’s high specifications and effectiveness in combat cooperation were proven.

Order #1142-328 of the Central committee of the CPSU and the Ministers’ Cabinet of the USSR had adopted the “Manevr” tactical-level C&C system for use by the Soviet Army.

A large group of the most successful specialists and workers involved in development and testing of the complex received state awards. In 1983 the Institute itself received a Red Banner Order of Labor for its perfomance in the field of creating special equipment.

Almost simultaneously with adopting the “Manevr” in the USSR, work began to arm the various Warsaw Pact states. Order #20 from 11.01.1983 of the Minister of Radio Industry appointed the Institute to lead the creation of a Joint Field Command and Control System for the armed forces of Warsaw Pact states. The project involved 58 foreign plants and 535 organizationsi n the USSR, which set up manufacture of tactical-level complexes and systems, as well as artillery and rocket forces’ control systems.

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An interesting historical document – a handwritten Soviet layout for the “Manevr”, used in the East German military.

Based on the Belarus Military District, a testing area was formed for the “Manevr” system to develop technological and software solutions, train specialists and deploy automation complexes in the armed forces.

In 1983, on the Dretun testing grounds in Belarus, a field exercise was carried out to test solutions for new types of units – reconnaissance-fire units and reconnaissance-strike units, using command posts armed with “Manevr”. The results of the exercised proved the decision to have been reasoanble and effective. This fact proves the possibility of expanding the area of use for such tactical-level automation complexes based on the conditions and requirements of the combat situation.

That said, use of the system in USSR and Warsaw Pact armies, as well as progress in electronics and communications equipment showed the necessity of additional development of tactical-level automation tools.

Therefore, in order #386 from 18.11.1985, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers ordered the Institute to improve “Manevr”.

The experience and high qualification of the institute’s specialists allowed to carry out the government’s assignment in a relatively brief timespan. In 1985-1987 the system was upgraded, including the computers, communications systems and software. State testing was carried out for the MP21R vehicle, and modificationso f the vehicle were made for various division officers. In 1986 automation reached the battalion levels. A command vehicle for battalion levels was created based on the BMP-2KSh chassis (chief designer O. A. Kaptzevich).

Further use and testing of the complexes in the regular use and training in combat-approximating conditions showed a meaningful improvement in system reliability and effectiveness.

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MP22R Division AA commander’s Vehicle

As the system modernization was completed, the institute became one of the leading organizations in the country in terms of developing integrated, global, territorially-distributed special-purpose control systems.

At this time a modern scientific school was founded at the institute. Among its founders we can rightfully count Podrezov, Nikolaev, Goncharov, as well as N. I. Azamatov (first deputy department head, later, in the 1980′s, department head and chief engineer).

Among its accomplishments are development of a conceptual approach to open system interation and being the first in the world to utilize it in the 1970′s and 1980′s for a command and control system. One has to also note its accomplishments in building distributed computing complex allowing for distributed data processing and data storage in distributed databases. The system solutions developed in the Institute allowed the creation of unique software/hardware complexes for force, arms, reconnaissance, and EW control, capable of optimal adaptation to changing conditions, user needs, as well as informational and logical compatibility of all components and subsystems.

The accomplishments of the Institute’s scientists and experts are especially valuable given they were all produced using Soviet-made electronics, inferior in its specifications to the best foreign models. Despite that, systems were made – including the “Manevr” that were superior to contemporary C&C systems in a range of tactical and use specifications.

In 1988 the development of computing and communications tools as well as information technology in general, both in our country and abroad, reached a completely new level and quality. This became the basis for further development of tactical C&C tools using modern communications and information technology, personal computers, telecommunications gear, local and global networking solutions, new approaches to informational, linguistic, and mathematical support, and organization of the computing process.

Starting 1988, under order of the Central committee of the CPSU and the national government based on the “Manevr” development plan, the Institute, in cooperation with other Soviet organizations and plants, had begun a complex systemic projects to develop a front-level C&C system known as “Avangard” (Vanguard) under its Chief Designer V.I. Goncharov.

The systemic process included a radical modernization of all C&C systems, including tactical ones. Work on “Avanguard” was completed in 1992, and the first practical results were to be seen in 1995, but given the well-known events and the collapse of the USSR work was stopped. For the Institute, a completely new story began. Still, the main solutions of the unfinished projects were used in various projects of the institute involved in foreign contracts for special equipment, and automation of the Belarussian armed forces.

Looking back into the past today, nearly 30 years after the adoption of the “Manever” one can confidently say this unique work was the most meaningful, complex work among all developed and adopted automated C&C systems.

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Words from a Bosnian Survivalist

Words from a Bosnian survivalist


Translator’s note: This tale had originally been recorded in french and then translated by two Russian survivalists who met the man. I have read it at hyperprapor’s blog. The Bosnian is anonymous for reasons which will soon be made clear from reading the articles. ~~ MicroBalrog

I am from Bosnia. You know, between 1992 and 1995 it was hell. For one year I lived, and survived, in a city with 6000 people, without water, electricity, gasoline, medical help, civil defense, distribution service, any kind of traditional service or centralized rule.

Our city was blockaded by the army and for 1 year life in the city turned into total crap. We had no army, no police, we only had armed groups – those armed protected their homes and families.

When it all started some of us were better prepared, but most of the neighbors families had enough food only for a few days. Some had pistols, a few had AK47s ( smile.gif ) or shotguns.

After a month or two gangs started operating, destroying everything. Hospitals, for example, turned into slaughterhouses. There was no more police. About 80% of the hospital staff were gone. I got lucky – my family at the time was fairly large (15 people in a large house, 6 pistols, 3 Aks), and we survived (most of us, at least).

The Americans dropped MREs every 10 days, to help blockaded cities. This was never enough. Some – very few – had gardens. It took 3 months for the first rumors to spread of men dying from hunger and cold. We removed all the doors, the window frames from abandoned houses, ripped up the floors and burned the furniture for heat. Many died from diseases, especially from the water (two from my own family). We drank mostly rainwater, ate pigeons and even rats.

Money soon became worthless. We returned to an exchange. For a tin can of tushonka you could have a woman (it is hard to speak of it, but it is true). Most of the women who sold themselves were desperate mothers.

Arms, ammunition, candles, lighters, antibiotics, gasoline, batteries and food. We fought for these things like animals. In these situations it all changes. Men become monsters. It was disgusting.

Strength was in numbers. A man living a lone getting killed and robbed would be just a matter of time, even if he was armed.

Today me and my family are well-prepared, I am well-armed. I have experience.

It does not matter what will happen – an earthquake, a war, a tsunami, aliens, terrorists, economic collapse, uprising. The important part is that something will happen.

Here’s my experience: you can’t make it on your own. Don’t stay apart from your family, prepare together, choose reliable friends.

1. How to move safely in a city

The city was divided into communities along streets. Our street (15-20 homes) had patrols (5 armed men every week) to watch for gangs and for our enemies.

All the exchanges occurred in the street. About five kilometers away was an entire street for trading, all well-organized, but going there was too dangerous because of the snipers. You could also get robbed by bandits. I only went there twice, when I needed something really rare (list of medicine, mainly antibiotics, of the French original of the texts).

Nobody used automobiles in the city: the streets were blocked by wreckage and by abandoned cars. Gasolnie was very expensive. If one needed to go somewhere, that was done at night. Never travel alone or in groups that were too big – always 2-3 men. All armed, travel swift, in the shadows, cross streets through ruins, not along open streets.

There were many gangs 10-15 men strong, some as large as 50 men. But where were also many normal men, like you and me, fathers and grandfathers, who killed and robbed. There were no “good” and “bad” men. Most were in the middle and ready for the worst.

2. What about wood? Your home city is surrounded by woods, why did you burn doors and furniture?

There were not that many woods around the city. It was very beautiful – restaurants, cinemas, schools, even an airport. Every tree in the city and in the city park was cut down for fuel in the first two months.

Without electricity for cooking and heat – we burned anything that burned. Furniture, doors, flooring – that wood burns swiftly. We had no suburbs or suburban farms. The enemy was in the suburbs. We were surrounded. Even in the city you never knew who was the enemy at any given point.

3. What knowledge was useful to you in that period?

To imagine the situation a bit better you should know it was practically a return to the stone age.

For example, I had a container of cooking gas. But I did not use it for heat – that would be too expensive! I attached a nozzle to it I made myself and used to fill lighters. Lighters were precious.

If a man brought an empty lighter, I would fill it and he would give me a tin of food or a candle.

I was a paramedic. In these conditions my knowledge was my wealth. Be curious and skilled. In these conditions the ability to fix things is more valuable than gold.

Items and supplies will inevitably run out, but your skills will keep you fed.

I wish to say this: learn to fix things, shoes, or people.

My neighbor, for example, knew how to make kerosene for lamps. He never went hungry.

4. If you had 3 months to prepare now, what would you do?

3 months? Run away from the country? (joking)

Today I know everything can collapse really fast. I have a stockpile of food, hygiene items, batteries… enough to last me for 6 months.
3 месяца ? Бежал бы за границу ? (шутка)

I live in a very secure flat, and own a home with a shelter in a village 5 kilometers away. Another six-month supply there too. That’s a small village, most people there are well-prepared. The war had taught them.

I have four weapons, and 2000 rounds for each.

I have a garden and have learned gardening. Also I have a good instinct – you know, when everyone around you keeps telling you it’ll all be fine, but I know – it will all collapse.

I have strength to do what I need to protect my family. Because when it all collapses you must be ready to do “bad” things to keep your children alive and protect your family.

Surviving on your own is practically impossible (that’s what I think). Even you’re armed and ready – if you’re alone, you’ll die. I have seen that happen many times.

Families and groups, well-prepared, with skills and knowledge in various fields – that’s much better.

5. What should you stockpile?

That depends. If you plan to live by theft – all you need is weapons and ammo. Lots of ammo.

If not – more food, hygiene items, batteries, accumulators, little trading items (knives, lighters, flints, soap). Also alcohol of a type that keeps well. The cheapest whiskey is a good trading item.

Many people died from insufficient hygiene. You’ll need simple items in great amounts. For example, garbage bags. Lots of them. And toilet papers. Non-reusable dishes and cups – you’ll need lots of them. I know that because we didn’t have any at all.

As for me, a supply of hygiene items is perhaps more important than food. You can shoot a pigeon, you can find a plant to eat. You can’t find or shoot any disinfectant.

Disinfectant, detergents, bleach, soap, gloves, masks…

First aid skills, washing wounds and burns. Perhaps you will find a doctor – and will not be able to pay him.

Learn to use antibiotics. It’s good to have a stockpile of them.

You should choose the simplest weapons. I carry a Glock .45, I like it, but it’s a rare gun here – so I have two TT pistols too (everyone has them and ammo is common).

I don’t like Kalashnikovs, but again, same story – everyone has them, so do I.

You must own small, unnoticeable items. For example: a generator is good, but 1000 Bic lighters are better. A generator will attract attention if there’s any trouble, but 1000 lighters are compact, cheap, and can always be traded.

We usually collected rainwater into 4 large barrels and then boiled it. There was a small river but the water in it became very dirty very fast.

It’s also important to have containers for water – barrels and buckets.

Were gold and silver useful?

Yes. I personally traded all the gold in the house for ammunition.

Sometimes we got our hands on money – dollars and deutschmarks. We bought some things for them, but this was rare and prices were astronomical – for example a can of beans cost $30-40. The local money quickly became worthless. Everything we needed we traded for through barter.

7. Was salt expensive?

Yes, but coffee and cigarettes were even more expensive. I had lots of alcohol and traded it without problems. Alcohol consumption grew over 10 times as compared to peacetime. Perhaps today it’s more useful to keep a stock of cigarettes, lighters, and batteries. They take up less space.

At this time I was not a survivalist. We had no time to prepare – several days before the shit hit the fan, the politicians kept repeating over the TV that everything was going according to plan, there’s no reason to be concerned. When the sky fell on our heads, we took what we could.

Was it difficult to purchase firearms? What did you trade for arms and ammunition?

After the war we had guns in every house. The police confiscated lots of guns at the beginning of the war. But most of them we hid. Now I have one legal gun that I have a license for. Under the law that’s called a temporary collection. If there is unrest, the government will seize all the registered guns. Never forget that.

You know, there are many people who have one legal gun – but also illegal guns if that one gets seized. If you have good trade goods you might be able to get a gun in a tough situation, but remember, the most difficult time is the first days, and perhaps you won’t have enough time to find a weapon to protect your family. To be disarmed in a time of chaos and panic is a bad idea.

In my case – there was a man who needed a car battery for his radio, he had shotguns – I traded the accumulator for both of them. Sometimes I traded ammunition for food, and a few weeks later traded food for ammunition. Never did the trade at home, never in great amounts.

Few people knew how much, and what, I keep at home.

The most important thing is to keep as many things as possible in terms of space and money. Eventually you’ll understand what is more valuable.

Correction: I’ll always value weapons and ammunition the most. Second? Maybe gas masks and filters.

9. What about security?

Our defenses were very primitive. Again, we weren’t ready, and we used what we could. The windows were shattered, and the roofs in a horrible state after the bombings. The windows were blocked – some with sandbags, others with rocks.

I blocked the fence gate with wreckage and garbage, and used a ladder to get across the wall. When I came home, I asked someone inside to pass over the ladder. We had a fellow on our street that completely barricaded himself in his house. He broke a hole in the wall, creating a passage for himself into the ruins of the neighbor’s house. A sort of secret entrance.

Maybe this would seem strange, but the most protected houses were looted and destroyed first. In my area of the city there were beautiful houses, with walls, dogs, alarms and barred windows. People attacked them first. Some held out, others didn’t – it all depended how many hands and guns they had inside…

I think defense is very important – but it must be carried out unobtrusively. If you are in a city and SHTF comes, you need a simple, non-flashy place, with lots of guns and ammo.

How much ammo? As much as possible.

Make your house as unattractive as you can.

Right now I own a steel door, but that’s just against the first wave of chaos. After that passes I will leave the city to rejoin a larger group of people, my friends andfamily.

There were some situations during the war… there’s no need for details, but we always had superior firepower, and a brick wall, on our side.

We also constantly kept someone watching the streets. Quality organization is paramount in case of gang attacks.

Shooting was constantly heard in the city.

Our perimeter was defended primitively – all the exits were barricaded and has little firing slits. Inside we had at least five family members ready for battle at any time, and one man in the street, hidden in a shelter.

We stayed home through the day to avoid sniper fire.

At first, the weak perish. Then the rest fight.

During the day, the streets were practically empty due to sniper fire. Defenses were oriented towards short-range combat alone. Many died if they went out to gather information, for example. It’s important to remember we had no information, no radio, no TV – only rumors and nothing else.

There was no organized army, every man fought. We had no choice. Everybody was armed, ready to defend themselves.

You should not wear quality items in the city – someone will murder you and take them. Don’t even carry a “pretty” longarm, it will attract attention.

Let me tell you something: if SHTF starts tomorrow I’ll be humble. I’ll look like everyone else. Desperate, fearful. Maybe I’ll even shout and cry a little bit.

Pretty clothing is excluded altogether. I will not go out in my new tacticool outfit to shout: “I have come! You’re doomed, bad guys!” No, I’ll stay aside, well-armed, well-prepared, waiting and evaluating my possibilities, with my best friend or brother.

Super-defenses, super-guns are meaningless. If people think they should steal your things, that you’re profitable – they will. It’s only a question of time and the amount of guns and hands.

How was the situation with toilets?
We used shovels and a patch of earth near the house. Does it seem dirty? It was. We washed with rainwater or in the river – but most of the time the latter was too dangerous. We had no toilet paper, and if we had any, I would have traded it away.

It was a “dirty” business.

Let me give you a piece of advice: you need guns and ammo first – and second, everything else. Literally EVERYTHING! All depends on the space and money you have.

If you forget something there’ll always be someone to trade with for it – but if you forget weapons and ammo, there will be no access to trading for you.

I don’t think big families are extra mouths. Big families means both more guns and strength – and from there, everyone prepares on his own.

11. How did people treat the sick and the injured?

Most injuries were from gunfire. Without a specialist and without equipment, if an injured man found a doctor somewhere, he had about a 30% chance of survival.

It ain’t the movie. People died. Many died from infections of superficial wounds. I had antibiotics for 3-4 uses – for the family of course.

People died foolishly quite often. Simple diarrhea will kill you in a few days without medicine, with limited amounts of water.

There were many skin diseases and food poisonings… nothing to it.

Many used local plants and pure alcohol – enough for the short-term, but useless in the long-term.

Hygiene is very important… as well as having as much medicine as possible. Especially antibiotics.

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Capturing Objectives With Airborne Forces – From the VDV Combat Manual

VDV Combat Manual, 1984 (Battalion-Company)
Chapter 4: The Offensive

2. Capturing objectives n the landing zone

125. The capturing and destruction of nuclear weaponry is to be carried out as part of any combat mission by the battalion (company). This includes silo rockets, mobile rocket complexes, warehouses and assembly facilities, nuclear landmines, command points, RADAR stations and other EW means.

The capture of silo rockets, warehouses, deployed nuclear landmines is to be carried out by parachute or air assault units, while their destruction is to be carried out by sappers.

The specific forces deployed to capture and destroy nuclear weapons and definite actions taken are defined by the strength of defending forces and the degree of pre-landing suppression as well as the terrain where the objects are deployed.

During capture of rockets stored in silos or underground their deployment area is normally first struck with nuclear weapons or, alternatively, aviation carrying conventional weapons.

After landing, the battalion (company) locates the silos, their access openings, command points, assaults rapidly on combat vehicles (if available), destroys the defending opponent and captures the shafts. A sapper element destroys the defenses of the entryways, ventilation shafts and communication points. Specially-designated units invade the underground complexes through the ruined entries, eliminate the crew, and disable the shaft or complex equipment.

Mobile rocket complexes and control gear, RADAR and EW means are to be destroyed by the battalion or company on their start points or on march towards their launch points.

When enemy nuclear rockets are detect, the battalion acts in accordance to circumstance to charge the target with their IFVs, ambush it, or attack it from the maximum effective range of their ATGMs, artillery and tripod-mounted AT rocket launchers. Measures are to be taken to intercept roads and other axis of mobility for the target. The main effort is to focus on rapid capture and disabling of launch-ready rockets, launchers, EW and guidance equipment.

When capturing nuclear arms warehouses or warhead assembly bases, battalion/company ORBAT must be prepared for the simultaneous extermination of guards and service personnel. Attack is usually carried out on AFVs from multiple directions. After capture, sappers will disable or prepare to evacuate the nuclear munitions. The battalion/company must be covered from counterattacks by guards or reserves, especially tanks.

During capture and destruction of nuclear landmines deployed in wells, the battalion’s units will act on AFVs, perform reconnaissance of the mines’ cover and guard units, destroy the enemy and cover the sappers that will use special equipment to locate and safely disarm the nuclear landmines.

If the nuclear landmine has already detonated, the commander must organize reconnaissance of the contamination and damage zone and decide to either bypass or leave the zone, or to pas through it on AFVs.

126. Captured nuclear weapons are to be disabled by demolishing launchers, rockets, nuclear mines, EW and guidance equipment with explosives, small arms, AFV and artillery fire. The decision to destroy or evacuate capture nuclear armaments is to be made by the senior commander.

127. Capturing government offices and command points is to be done by the battalion (company) as part of the regiment or brigade (battalion). Its actions depend on the location and mobility of the command point, as well as the forces and means available for their defense and the presence of enemy reserves. At any case, the CP’s communications with the forces must be cut off first.

When capturing an underground CP, the battalion (company) charges and destroys defenders and guards and disables antenna equipment. Units will then burst in, exterminate or capture personnel, capture documents and siable communications. When it is impossible to access underground buildings, they are to be blocked, access points guarded, ventilation ducts, energy and water supply disabled or destroyed, and other measures to disrupt operations at the CP taken.

Operations to capture mobile CPs must be rapid and daring. Attacks are usually on AFVs attacking from multiple directions. The battalion/company commander’s order to capture mobile CPs must include recon measures (including radio recon), interception of retreat paths, interception of reserves, capture of landing pads and destruction of parked helicopters and aircraft.

CPs that are on the move and redeploying can be destroyed by ambushes, attacks on staff car and communications gear columns, while destroying personnel and command means as a priority. POWs and documents are to be turned over to the regimental or brigade HQ. When capturing communications points one must destroy antenna equipment, broadcast/reception stations, communications and energy production gear.

128. Airfields are captured for destruction of OPFOR airplanes, crew, and ground crew and the reuse of the airfield by our forces. In some cases the airfield can be disabled.

When capturing the airfield the battalion (company) is deployed directly on the airfield or nearby. It must destroy nuclear-capable aircraft, combat and transport aircraft, flight control equipment, nuclear and conventional arms and fuel warehouses, and ATC. The first task is to destroy landed aircraft with fire from all weapons and prevent them from landing. Units paradropped directly onto the airfields are to collect documents and POWs while rapidly advancing to target points, attacking them and exterminating the enemy.

Artillery units act within the rask of parachute or air assault units, destroying enemy aircraft, manpower, or weapons used to protect and guard the airport. Cover units will deploy on the approaches to the airfield, deploy on advantageous positions at 2-4 kilometers from it and prevent reinforcement. Some of the units are deployed to ambushes on the likely approach paths to the the airfield, or used as a reserve.

The airfield is to be disabled by sapper and parachute (air assault) units by destroying runway elements or creating engineering obstacles, destroying ATC points, equipment and fuel. If one intends to use the airfield for landing transport aircraft, one is to take measures to clean or repair the runway, taxiways and loading/unloading slots for the aircraft.

129. On water obstacles, the battalion/company may capture bridges and fording means, as well as fording points. This is to be done by an attack on several directions on one or both shores. Part of the forces is to be assigned to prevent the approach of OPFOR reserves, while attached combat engineer units will perform engineering recon of the crossing point. If needed it will remove obstacles or demine bridges. Captured fords are to be held for a needed time, or until the approach of advanced forces, or destroyed.

130. During the capture of a beachead for landing naval infantry, the battalion/company is deployed on an LZ near the water or deep on the beachead, destroys enemy basepoint and captures anti-landing obstacles and useful defensive points against enemy reserves and oves to a defensive. THe combat engineers attached to the unit will recon and breach the obstacles on the shore and in the water, as well as marking amphibious landing points.

Capture activities may be supported by naval artillery and air strikes. Cooperation with naval infantry is to be organized by the senior commander.

131. Capturing naval bases and ports by the battalion or company is to be done as part of a regiment, brigade, or battalion. Targets may include command and headquarters points, ships, conventional and atomic munitions warehouses, energy and water supplies, air and anti-landing defenses.

The landing is usually near the base/port. The battalion/company advances on AFVs or on foot, attacks and captures the objective. When the objective is prepared, a battalion may form an assault unit, and the company – an assault team, including artillery and engineering units. Captured objects are to be destroyed and disabled by sappers. If the base or port is to be used by our forces, the battalion/company will move on to defensive positions.

132. When acting to disrupt rear-echelon OPFOR activities the battalion/company captures and destroys/disables warehouses, rail stations, rail and road equipment, CPs, pipelines and pump stations, factories, energy and hydrotechnical equipment, disrupts transport. Warehouses may be captured for use by our forces. Capturing of orear-echelon objects is to be done by charges from various directions, while part of the unit is tasked to prevent reinforcements.

When disabling a factory one is to destroy (by detonation) energy and water supplies, fuel, material, and product warehouses. At power plants and dams one is to destory dams, turbines, and generators.

At rail stations or junctions one is first to disable/destroy/demolish railroad switches on entry an exit, signals, safety, power supply and communication equipment. Military trains on the station are to be blocked and destroyed with fire and decisive attacks.

On highways one is to destroy bridges, viaducts, overpasses, and junctures. One can also damage the road surface in areas where vehicles will not be able to rapidly bypass it and a bypass cannot be quickly built – in swamp terrain, between lakes, in shallows, on mountain sides.

Translated by MicroBalrog
Original document

 

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RP-SPN Special Forces Food Ration

RP-SPN Special Forces Food Ration

Translated by MicroBalrog, text and photos by k_a_r_d_e_n

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The kit is made by “Prodmaster” LLC.

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It’s some serious kit. On the left we can see the standard IRP kit.

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It looks somewhat like the gift packages we received in the First and the beginning of the second Chechen War – in the sense that it contains products that are not only good for the stomach, but also for the soul smile.gif

We do not receive such kits – we only get them when we cross-train with our “older brothers” from Spetznas units. They are also a bit curious about our kits.

The box is fairly large. It is not sealed hermetically, and is opened like the American MREs – which I personally view as a bit of a disadvantage.
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The presence of reusable packages allows us to use them for garbage, or as hermetic packaging, or to pack items like water containers. They also allows us to carry remains of the meal without carrying the sizable box.

Let’s open it and take a look…

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According to the proverb “bread is the head of all” we will begin with standard Army bread.

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The second ‘head’ of the ration – and in fact the synonym of the word ‘ration’ for many – is [url=]tushonka[/url].
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Buckwheat and beef.

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Noodles.
We call them the BitchPack. Although they’re rather dubious in terms of chemical content, sometimes you just want hot, liquid food.

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«Zucchini Caviar”. A real Russian delicacy. biggrin.gif

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Saury Some pleasant variety.

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Can opener.

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Condensed milk!
Now we know the solution to the question “what to do when you opened the tin and you do not want to eat anymore.”

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They abolished the tin itself. In the field I used plastic covers from coffee tins to close the tins of condensed milk.

This reminds me of a story in my own life. In my early adolescence/late childhood we kids got our hands on a case of condensed milk tins. It lasted me a lot – only years later, during assignments to a certain famous region of the world, I did I touch a can of condensed milk again. Our menu included three forms of recipes based on this milk:

Coffee with condensed milk
Boiled water with condensed milk.
Boiled rice, mixed with condensed milk and biscuits (nothing childish is foreign to us).

Now comes the second pleasant surprise: bitter chocolate.

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Two packages of tea:

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Sugar:
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Apple juice. In negative temperatures it can also be used as fruit ice cream:

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Portable heater.

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Moist tissues:

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A polivitamin pill, a Galina Blanca cube, chewing gum and a lighter.

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The only thing this has to do with regular chewing gum is that it can be chewed.

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But not really as chewing gum, but as a bunch of strange lumps with an incomprehensible taste.

(Translator’s note: It’s made in Belarus. Don’t source your chewing gum to Belarus, kids.)

Well, the kit is fairly interesting and has a wide variety of products in it…


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THE LAST ARMORED TRAINS OF THE SOVIET ARMY

THE LAST ARMORED TRAINS OF THE SOVIET ARMY
Author: Victor Markovsky
Photo: Oleg Pokladkov
Arms World Magazine, vol. 9/2005
Translated by Allanea Courtesy of Otvaga

The topic of armored trains is naturally associated with the Russian Civil War, where they were the main weapons. They were also used in the Great Patriotic War at a lesser rate, and eventually forgotten and replaced with more modern armaments. But history eventually brought to the restoration of armored trains.

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An armored train on a Zabaikalsk Military District storage base

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After the trains were disbanded, only their armored locomotives remained. The TG-16 locomotives is first in the link.

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The TGM-14 armored maneuver locomotive was the propulsion method for the light strike groups.

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The maneuver locomotive machinists’ seat.

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HQ armored railcar with its CP and communications equipment. Platforms on both ends of the railcar are armed with AA guns.

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The commander’s seat aboard the locomotive is equipped with observation equipment.

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T62s on armored platforms are the key weapons of the mobile strike group. Next to it, in an armored room, sits an infantry detachment.

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The T-62 deploys off the platform.

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A PT-76 on its plafrom.

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The PT-76 uses ramps to disembark from its platform.

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AA platform with ZU-23-4 and ZU-23. The central armored box houses the ammunition.

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Full-traverse ZU-23 mount.

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Ballast plaform protects the train in the case of track damage and houses repair equipment.

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This was the state of the trains in summer 2005. Only the locomotives remained functional. The armored platforms and railcars were cut up for scrap.

In the 1960′s our relations with China began to degrade, resulting eventually in the events on Damansky Island in March 1968. The two weeks of combat put our nations at the brink of war, costing our country a lot of blood, and five armored vehicles (including a T-62 captured by the Chinese, see also The Myth of the Tank). Only the use of heavy force, including tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers of the 135th Pacific Ocean Red Banner Mechanized Infantry Division, resolved the situation.

Clearly this was only the beginning. On the other side of the border, the PLA was beginning to accumulate for – 44 divisions, 4,300 tanks and 10,000 artillery guns and MLRS. Reserves included up to 30 well-trained militia divisions, almost equaling the regular army in their skills, not to mention the immense personnel reserves of China. In short the PLA was capable of covering the entire border with troops at the levels of up to a company per 200-300 meters of front.

The opposing Soviet forces were not even comparable – up until recently China was a well-supported ally. Especially disconcerting was the fact that the opposing PLA forces were armed almost exclusively with Soviet weapons – while the Trans-Baikal area had been armed with second-rate weaponry. Even the defensive lines and fortifications on the border were planned in the pre-war years, when Karbyshev was in charge there as an Engineer-Colonel. Further, the area had been struck heavily by Khruschev’s military cuts. Obvious also was the fact that the Chinese military was well-aware of our force structure and infrastructure capacity. GRU and General Staff Operational Office experts expected that in full-scale combat the advancing Chinese forces could advance at a speed of 15-20 km/h and up to 200-250 kilometers per day. The steppe was on the opponent’s side – the rare rarity of forests, rivers, and other natural obstacles made it possible for the enemy to develop his offensive in every direction after breaching the border.

Rapid measures were needed to fix the situation. Without much ado (Damansky was yet to happen), the Cabinet and MoD took a range of measures to improve the defensive capacity of border areas. Starting in Summer 1967, troops began to move from the central districts to the Far East and Trans-Baikal region, starting with tank and mechanized infantry units. From the Baltic, the Far East District received the 21st Guards Tank Division, while the Leningrad District sent the 2nd Tank Division to the Trans-Baikal. The 5th Guards TD, 32nd, 66th, 49th and 111th Tank Division arrived in the same area. By the early 1970′s the Trans Baikal District’s army corps became the 39th Combined Arms Army, which also deployed a forward group in Mongolia. The total number of tank units on the Chinese border reached 7 (including a training division,

In the Trans-Baikal area, the MoD also deployed two dozen air regiments, forming the 23rd Air Army. The domination of strike bombers and fighter-bombers allowed to compensate for the opponent’s numerical superiority, as they would become relatively easy prey for aviation in the wild stepps of the Trans-Baikal.

However, the low development of the area tied almost all units to the Trans-Siberian and Trans-Baikal railroads. Resupply and redeployment of the forces, as well as any regroupings in the event of an invasion of opponent forces outnumbering them by a great factor would depend on these “roads of life” A motorized division required 18-20 trains to relocate, the roads could allow for shifting 3-5 divisions a day. This was compounded by the lack of proper automobile roads (proper highways do not link Russia to the Far East to this day) [Translator’s note: this has changed since the writing of the article). As the Trans-Siberian lay only within 70-100 kilometers from the border, it would be directly threatened in case of a conflict. Every day, 60-70 trains moved cargo along the road to the Far East. Later on the BAM was constructed directly to be a safe backup to the Trans-Siberian. It was not intended to be an alternative – every day it could shift only 6-8 trains.

Thus the creation of the Trans-Baikal defenses was tied to the rail network. Already in March 1966 the 97th and 114th Fortified Areas were formed, garrisoned around the stations of the Trans-Baikal Railroad. They were intended to fortify the border area. Some of them were even formed in front of the border posts and fortifications, covering them with their equipment and firepower. Their officers and men were to act as a front-line barrier, holding off the enemy in his area of responsibility for several days needed to deploy the forces of the military district and mobilize their reserves.

The headquarters and command of the 97th Fortified Area was at Biltut Station, south-east of Chita, while the 114th was headquartered near Sherlovaya Gora station, 50 kilometers off the border. These fortified areas were similar in personnel numbers to a regiment, but were armed like a mechanized infantry division. Given the low resources, equipment for the area was pulled in from central-district units and and the reserve division stockpiles

The 97th Fortified Area was armed with 3 mechanized infantry battalions deployed near Bi-Liyutuy station (four companies each), a sapper battalion, a signals and repair battalion. There were also four tank battalions of four companies each, equipped with various tanks – T-34/85, IS-2, IS-3, IS-4, T-54, T-55, and OT-55. The vehicles arrived from every part of the country, and 80 IS-4s were received in 1968 from Belarus, where they had been stored. Despite the tanks being rather old and varied, they were still rather effective – all they needed to do was deploy and take up a position.

At Dauria Station, near lake Shakhali, the 255th Machinegun-Artillery Battalion was deployed with six companies, including two tank companies, each armed with a dozen OG-55 and T-35/85 tanks (the latter were later replaced with IS-4 tanks, while the T-34s went for Bilbut). Near the border, at Zaibaikalsk station (up until 1960 it was named “Repulse” in memory of the war for the Far East railroad, and was clearly renamed too early) the 256th Machinegun-Artillery Battalion stood. In total the Fortified Area had about 230 tanks, a separate AT battalion with 85mm guns and a battery of BM-13 MLRS.

The 114th Fortified Area had a similar make-up and approximately similar forces. Apart from the fortified areas, the Trans-Baikal military district had a unique unit – the Machinegun-Artillery Divisions, supposed to hold off Chinese personnel (the famed human-wave attacks). It is notable that one of the division commanders was Lt. Colonel Alsan Mashadov, who received the most flattering references from his superiors.

Defending the rail lines was a hard task. The sparse steppe, with its rare stations and isolated villages, not only the rail itself, but the various rail junctions, tunnels, and rail bridges were vulnerable – and capture or destruction of these objectives would isolate not merely the garrisons, but the entire area. Turning every object into a defensive line would have separated the forces – there were over 1200 such points. Ordinary means of guarding the rail were also not a solution – anybody who has ever seen a pair of guards by a rail service buildin knows what we’re talking about. A mobile, effective weapon was needed. Thus appeared the armored trains.

“Where there is a road – we can help.” This motto of the rail forces suggested the solution. Reanimating the concept of armored trains was entrusted to the Kharkov Transport Factory. After the Damansky conflict it was tasked with building an armored trains. Though it had a civilian name, starting with 1964 it was given over to the Ministry of Defensive Production and almost entirely specialized in military equipment. That said, it had great experience producing rail transport in the post-war era, especially heavy diesel engines and main-line locomotives (let us remember it started building tanks when it was known as the Kharkov Steam Locomotive Plant). In the 1950′s and 1960′s it developed a gas-turbine locomotive, gas-diesels, TE-7 and TE-15 locomotives with a top speed of 160 kph, and even a project for a superpowered atomic locomotive, entirely autonomous for months without refueling. In the post-war years it produced 1852 locomotives – and, ironically, some of its locomotives and tanks had gone to China.

As the factory moved to war production, its locomotive lines were folded and given over to other factories, while the production facilities where they stood moved on to production of the T-64. However the factory still maintained Locomotive Design Department #65, which took a major role in creating the armored train. Given that the general director of the plant was a talented, capable man – O.V. Soich, the factory had experience and great production capacity, it was clear why it got the task.

A.D. Mondrus was put in charge of the project. To speed up work, the design widely utilized off-the-shelf, standard products – the locomotive, platforms, wheel sets and car elements, tank guns and turrets (as used during the Great Patriotic War). Neighboring design units assisted in creating the armor, armament, fire control and signals element. The turrets, guns, and sights came off the T-55, and the AA armament was to include two Shilka turrets with their four linked AA guns and RADAR.

A high-power diesel locomotive was chosen. Electric locomotives were rejected immediately – only a small part of the railroads behind the Urals were electrified, and furthmore electric lines became extremely vulnerable during a war – any rip in the cables, much less of airstrikes on the power plants and substations would end train movements.

The end of its rail production made the Kharkov factory cooperate with other plants. Department 65 took up development, the armored locomotive was manufacture in the Lyudinov plant, the Kalinin machinery factory made the armored railcars, and the Mariupol Metallurgical Factory made the armored railcars, armor, and tank turrets. The train was complete by 1970.

By this time the experimental “land cruiser” was tested in success – but never fielded. The situation with the PRC calmed down, so did the borders. In December 1970, Department 65 was shut down and its documents archived and transferred to other, relevant organizations.

Along the armored train, other inventions were also decomissioned. Among them was “Chertopolokh” (Thistle): a network of one- or two-man underground DOTs, featuring retractable grenade launcher and machinegun mounts, invisible and virtually invulnerable, which would rise to the surface to fire. In the border area it was planned to build more powerful, rapid-assembly concrete DOTS, composed of a large underground fighting compartment, living area, ammunition storage and signals equipment. The roof of the DOT would be flush with the ground, equipped with a tank turret. Prototypes had been built, but mass production did not commence due to costs.

Partial normalization with China did not mean it was a friend to the USSR. In February 1979, when relations worsened again, the Central Far Eastern command was formed, commanding Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal forces, the Pacific Fleet, and several Air Armies and AA armies. Thus, the issue of maneuvering cover with armored trains rose again.

Given the Tenth Five-Year plan already kept the military factories loaded to nearly 100% of capacity, working three shifts a day, the design was simplified and used as many off-the-shelf parts as possible.

The main task remained the protection of dispersed objects. Thus the train was modular, consisting of several autonomous “armored flying groups”. These carried tanks, increasing their flexibility and reducing their dependency on the rail itself. Already in the Great Patriotic War this was practiced by the Germans, who used light tanks on rail platforms to fight partisans.

The armored train now had as its main unit of armored flying groups, each composed of two open-topped 55-ton railcars carrying a T-62 tank (or any other tank, even if it could not move, as long as it could shoot) and a TGM-14 armored maneuver locomotive. The wheels and brakes of the platforms were covered with armored skirts, while the platforms housed not only the tank, but also an armored box for an infantry detachment and its weapons. The boxes had firing ports, a commander’s turret with a periscope, and radios. They could also be removed if needed. Each mobile group had 25 troops, and the train could carry up to five such groups, depending on its task. They could be used both as part of the train and separately.

The tactics for the train assumed deploying in the target area, with the armored groups deploying to protect the target objectives. It was believed two tanks and two detachments of infantry could protect a typical railroad item like a bridge or crossing. If needed more than one armored group would deploy. The platforms had ramps for the tanks to deploy, or the tanks could fight directly from the platforms. The trains could be used as a mobile reserve and fire support, while the tanks counterattacked. It was believed each armored group could protect an AOR of up to 100 km, therefore an armored train could cover 500 km of ground – the distance from Ulan-Ude to Irkutsk.

If the train operated in its full complement, it was even more formidable. It was controlled from an armored railcar with communications equipment and work stations for the commander and staff. For working in contaminated area it was hermetically sealed and equipped with filters and ventilation gear. Open platforms the train carried 23mm AA guns similar to those seen on Shilkas, but without RADARs and turrets. The train’s AA weapons were complemented by a special armored railcar based on an ordinary platform. In its central section it had a command point, while the open platforms at the ends carried a ZU-23-4 gun and ZU-23 twin-link gun on each. The central box also provided shelter for crew and ammunition. Further, MANPAD teams could fire from the open platforms. The TG-16 locomotive was also armored, with the steel plates covering the machinist’s cabin, the power room, and even the massive fuel tanks under the floor, covered with lowered steel skirts. The armor had access hatches and venting blinds, while the control cabin had two levels, with the machinist’s room below and a fighting compartment with a commander’s seat above. The locomotive’s bridge was also equipped with small arms firing ports.

As any proper infantry or tank unit, the train also had a recon unit made out of two PT-76 amphibious tanks. Their platform was armored with more armor – two-meter-tall armor sheets that could be opened from the front or rear to function as onramps.

A fully kitted-out train was supposed to work as follows: In front there was a cover platform to protect in case of someone blowing up the rails (it carried rails and other parts for its repair, and the train had a repair team on board), a locomotive, two tank armored teams, followed by an HQ railcar in the middle, an AA platform and two PT-76 platforms. Three more armored teams and a cover railcar completed the train. It could also include personnel railcars (boxcars or passenger) and rail field kitchens.

The train also included on its ORBAT a recon company of 8 BTR-40 (ZhD) vehicles. These were equipped from the rear and the front with folding mounts with leafsprings and steel train wheels with internal reboards, could move on rails at a speed of 80 kph (propelled by the main wheels). The vehicles took 3-5 minutes to switch from conventional to rail drive. For long-range transport of these vehicles the train could be given 4 more regular platforms to carry two BTR-40 (ZhD) vehicles each.

Despite the complexities of big politics, the armored trains served quietly. They were mostly stored at a minor rail station near Chita, their readiness tested by locomotive engine starting, maneuvering and tank exercises. The ammunition was stored separately. In 1986 one of the trains was used at the site of a rail accident, the tanks used to tow derailed railcars.

In January 1990 these trains were ordered for deployment to suppress the anti-government uprising in Baku and the Nationalist uprising in Sumgait. The trains were intended for use to protect the rails in the difficult conditions of the Transcaucasus area. The strategically-important area was only linked to the central areas of the country with two rail lines. The trains were not adopted to making a long-range journey. It took them weeks to cross the entire country. By the time they arrived, Baku was under control of Soviet forces, a decisive role played by VDV troops of the 103rd Guards Division, transported by air. The trains’ orders were not however canceled and they arrived fully armed. As they prepared their arms the crews got a rare opportunity to fire live rounds. From their platforms, on the move, tankers fired at abandoned buildings in the steppe and other targets – an event not seen on our rails for nearly half a century.

After they arrived at the destination the trains protected key stations, force echelons and cargo trains, protecting the latter from looters. Often they were shot at but ordered not to open fire.

After their return home, the trains were placed at a rocket and artillery storage base 40 kilometers away from Chita. After the military districts were united they were transferred to the Siberian Military District, with two of the trains put in long-term storage. It is notable that even in the difficult years of the 1990s, when tanks and jets were scrapped by the hundreds, the four trains were kept in a propoer state, fully equipped and armed. True, the entrenching gear had to be welded in place to avoid theft, and the autocannon warehoused. Still, the metal thieves nearly got their way – two trains left the station and went in the direction of the Chinese border, but were intercepted and returned.

Military cuts eventually reached the trains in the early 21st centuries. With the fortified areas long in disrepair, the train platforms and railcars were gradually, one after another, scrapped. Only the armored locomotives of the trains and armored groups remain now in storage, standing orphaned in a dead end in the taiga.

 

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Baikal, Terek, and Co.

Baikal, Terek, and Co.
Gennady Zhilin, Tankomaster #7, 2003
Translated by MicroBalrog courtesy of Otvaga 

In recent years, various periodicals included material on the use of various weaponry in Chechnya. However, this pertained mostly to the army and MoI – though the United Group of Forces utilizes also various other units, including units that are small – but without which the forces could not function or even exist.

Among other things the UGF depends on thousands of tons of fuel, ammunition, and supplies. Since the opponent began to utilize MANPADs in the second half of 2002, rail travel became the main means of personnel transport as well. Securing its functions is the task of Russian Federation rail forces.

More specifically the task includes technical support, demining, and maintaining rail in the Chechen Republic, protecting military trains on the Mozdok-Gudermes-Hankala railroad and protecting the bases of the rail forces involved in the counterterrorist operation. These tasks are performed under constant enemy opposition, attacks and sabotage on rail, rail bridges and stations.

Therefore the most difficult task – engineering reconnaissance of rail, complete demining and train escort is entrusted to special trains. The UGF men often refer to them as ‘armored trains’, though this is not fully technically correct. 2-3 such trains are on duty at any given time, while reserve trains are prepared for action on one of the stations of the North Caucasus Railroad. In late 2002 the UGF deployed three armored trains. In accordance with Russian tradition, they had names: “Amur”, “Baikal”, and “Terek”.

.The trains are not standardized at all, and differ in composition, armament, and even paint schemes, each a unique creation of the rail forces. Typically they include:

*1-2 cargo flatcars armed with ZU-23-2
*1-2 flatcars armed with BMP-2
*1-2 flatcars armed with T-62
*An enclosed armored railcar with small arms firing slits and roof turrets for machineguns and AGLs.
*An enclosed supply car
*1-2 passenger cars for crew rest on bases and guarded stations
*2-3 flatcars with ballast (sandbags) to protect against contant-fuzed munitions
*1-2 platforms with automobile-based radio stations
*A locomotive.

Each of the train has its own combination of these, and some may be lacking. For example, the “Terek” special train has no armored railcar for rifle and AGL positions, but it is the only one with factory-made armored platforms and cars. Moreover, the train’s composition may vary. That said, the trains are almost almost armed at least with ZU-23-2, BMP-2, and T-62 flatcars.

The BMP-2 and ZU-23-2 flatcars are equipped as follows. The ZU-23-2 guns are equipped with steel shields from the front, and their cars have shelters, made of railroad ties and covered with thick steel sheets on the outside, on one or two ends of the platform. Similar shelters are placed on BMP-2 and radio vehicle flatcars, installed at the rear of the vehicle. The BMP-2s are covered from the flanks with log walls, and the radio cars – with railroad ties and steel and sandbags.

The “Terek” is the most handsome and technically interesting of the armored train. For example, it utilizes a platform which has a wooden shelter on one hand and a factory-made armored shelter on the other. The radio car also has such a shelter. Both are equipped with small arms hatches. But the train’s main specialty is the presence of real, “armored-train”, factory-made armored platform and railcar.

The armored platform utilizes thick armored plate, with the plates on the roof inclined. The armored compartment is mounted on the middle on the platform, the ends carrying. In September 2002, when the image was taken, these were a ZU-23-2 and an NSV, which was later replace with a second autocannon. The sides of the car can be folded for firing. If they cannot be folded, small arms hatches in the sides are also present.

The armored railcar is also comprised of flat armored plate, poised vertically. Over the roof hatches the railroad warriors installed two railroad-tie turrets with machineguns and an AGL. Firing hatches are also present. THe camouflage pattern is of light-grey/dark-green schem. THe vehicle itself is well-designed and produced in a high squality.

Between missions, the armored trais stay at a special base in Hankala, equipped for crew rest and train maintenance. The author has personally visited the based and can commend it for high quality of equipment, comfort, design, cleanliness and order.

But the story of the armored trains used in the Chechen Republic would not be complete if one would not tell the story of yet another, very unique train. In October 2002 the Rail Forces Command – as well as UGF Command – were surprised to see in Hankala a new armored train of unknown origin. This monstrosity on wheels was created the by the Ministry of the Interior and bore the fearsome name “Kozma Minin.” Its crew comprised of members of the Special Police Unit of te Chief Directorate of Internal Affairs for Transport. Its appearance has no logical explanation whatsoever – even discounting reserves, the above armored trains where more than enough. The main task of the train was transporting MoI personnel and small cargoes.

The “Kozma Minin”, nicknamed “Kuzma” by men of the UGF, was colorful and original”, which you can see in the author’s few photographs of this train. It appeared and disappeared at unpredictable moments. Not having its own base, it could be located anywhere on the complex Hankala rail system.

It main armament was ZPU-4 guns, a BMP-2, and a strange contraption on a flatbed, equipped with firing slits for AGLs, machineguns, and other weapons. The ZPU-4 guns were mounted at the center of a platform. Its ends were shielded by unwieldy contraptions of railroad ties, logs, and wood sheets, sometimes by large steel shees, and covered from the sides with ripped, dirty, and old camouflage nets. They were used as living quarters for the weapon crews and supplies.

The BMP-2 was entirely unshieleded, except for some sandbags that covered only the wheels. The crew shelter was a large set-up made of railroad ties and steel sheets, covered entirely with camo nets. It was used as crew quarters and storage. In front of the BMP, a pile of uncleaned birch logs were piled on the plafotrm, apparently as both cover and fuel supply for the stove placed in the shelter.

But the most unique and interesting vehicle was a semblance of the long-term firing position, except constructed from railroad ties and logs, covered in sheets of wood and massive metal plates, armed with AGLs and machineguns. The device almost entirely covered with large pieces of elderly camouflage nets, in order to conceal the “unique” nature of the structure and, probably, confuse the bandits even more completely.

It was on this platform that a massive Russian flag waved proudly on its mast. (It was traditional in all armored trains to install a large state flag on the most heavily-protected rail cars). Camouflage was applied only to the enclosed wagon (dark-brown spots on light green) and the ZPU platform (a mix of green and bright yellow, with some black stripes and edges). The words “Kozma Minin” in large white letters were inscribed on the passenger car and enclosed car.

Despite many drawbacks of the design, the men of the Internal Forces were very happy and proud to have THEIR OWN ARMORED TRAIN [capitalization in the original] and honestly thought tit to be the equal of all the others.

Throughout the entire usage period, the special trains carried out their tasks, proving their usefulness and neessity. Among others, they carried out the following missions:

* Engineering reconnaissance of over 32000 kilometers of rail on the Hankala-Gudermes-Chervlenaya-Uzlovaya-Mozdok railroad.
* Total demining of over 1000 kilometers of rail on the Hankala-Gudermes-Chervlenaya-Uzlovaya-Mozdok railroad.
* Escorting over 100 military trains on the Hankala-Gudermes-Chervlenaya-Uzlovaya-Mozdok railroad.

The trains established reliable transport and resupply for all the needs of the UGF. In the period from August 28 to the end of 2002 they escorted 20,000 troops by railroad, working in all weather conditions and under bandit attacks.

[partial and uninformative list of attacks ommited]

It has to be said that the crews not only carried out their work with risk to life and limb, but also inflicted casualties on the bandits, as well as defused or destroyed a large amount of booby traps, mines, and other items. The rail forces’ warriors displayed professionalism, perseverance, bravery and valor. All this is to a great extent a result of the hard work of the rail forcs’ officers and commanders.

The author of this publication has never been a rail forces man, but a senior officer in the Russian Army. In his assignments in 2000 and 2002 he was assigned in the operational control department of UGF HQ and often had to work with rail forces men, and thus knows the cost and meaning of their service. As such, this article is intended to she light not only on the use of weapons and equipment, but to pay a debt of respect and gratitudes to brothers in arms who do their warriror’s duty with valor and honor.

The author apologizes to his readers for providing incomplete, partly vague information. This is related to requirements of secrecy and the inability of the author to provide enough time in his assignments to study and photograph armored trains.

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The Terek’s locomotive 

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The Terek’s ballast car

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Baikal’s ZSU-23 emplacement. The gun is placed on a wooden pedestal, with metal cabinets for equipment to its sides

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Rear view of the Baikal’s armament. Clearly visible is the radio station’s shelter

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Baikal’s armored railcar in three-color paint-scheme. Clearly visible are firing slits and turrets

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Terek’s radio station railcar

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Terek platform and railroad tie shelter

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BMP-2 on the Baikal. Note BMP-2 has distinct camouflage

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Terek armored platform

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Terek Armored platform interior

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Terek’s ZSU-23 mount. Baikal armored train seen on left

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Terek’s NSV emplacement

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Terek armored platform interior

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Terek T-62 platform, February 2003
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Terek autocannon-armed railcar, February 2003

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Terek armored railcar

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Kozma Minin enclosed railcar

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Kozma Minin passenger railcar

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DOT built on the Minin

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Kozma Minin flatbed with ZPU-4

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Rail forces sappers demining a road

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An officer and private from the rail forces. Behind them is a BRDM-2 fixed on the Baikal’s flatbed, Hankala, February 2003

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A Letter from the Pinsk Partisans to Adolf Hitler

The following letter was written by Pinsk-area Partisans to Adolf Hitler, and typed up in over 200 copies. Copies of this letter survived to this day in internal Soviet communication from 1944. As will be seen, there are good reasons it was not widely publicized in the Soviet era.
QUOTE
To the Commander-in-Chief of Germany, robber of France, Holland and Denmark, thief from Belgium, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Norway, initiator of the global war, the hangman of our country, the mad strategist that causes the world to laugh, the ersatz-Napoleon looking more like a crow, dubbed in German Fuhrer the Great and in Russian the wild bandit, the Corporal in Retirement – Little Hitler the Ober-Scumbag.Business Offers, Advice and Suggestions from the Pinsk Partisans, Written Down by Ivan.

You and your gang, including Ribbentrop, decided to enslave Europe. A dickhead like you could not figure out how dumb that was. Your sheep-head could not figure out you couldn’t carry this one out. It seems the horse that gave birth to you filled your head with bread, not brains. The Germans thought you are a Napoleon and came in the water, not knowing where to cross. Instead of a conquered Europe, you got kneed in the arse. You’re hanging on so far by a thread, but soon you will get cockslapped in the head. And from your fascist nest not even a cock will be left standing, you German pussy.

Dickhead, remember how you scared us? You barked like a bitch, world-wide: “I won it alone – the Red Army is defeated, its air force is beaten, Moscow is done for.”  But nobody believed you, you devil’s-navel. You fucking louse cannot scare us with such cockery, we knew that you, old far, are a famous braggart. We knew, fuck your mother in her Berlin, that soon you will shit your pants! And we were right too!

The Fritzes ran from Moscow, shitting their heels and losing their pants. In Stalingrad we’ve opened the gates of Hell. At Orel they got a stake up their head. From Belgorod your hosts fled, shitting their heels, not looking back. At Pripyat and Berezina the Fritzes have shat plenty in their pants as well. In short we’re smashing up your heads and tails, as if you were lazy horses.

Your pants-shitters fled the English and Americans in Africa. You’re getting beaten in Italy, and soon will be beat somewhere else, too. In short, even a fool can see you are screwed.

It is strange, however, that the Germans put up with a such a shit, such a brainless idiot, at the head of a country. Maybe they should put you up to cleaning latrines, you will be able to contemplate everything. A warrior like you is best fit to clean up piss and shit. A strategist like you will make laugh a chicken too.

Listen on, dumbass, to the word of the Pinsk Partisans. Listen on, fucked-up scum and tie it to your shit-covered mustache. You have threatened us a plenty, but we lay a cock on you and beat your punishment team on. You then sent Goebbels to write leaflets urging us to surrender and live in the German paradise. You brainless idiot, tell Goebbels this won’t work – our Motherland is not for sale, and we spit on your leaflets. Sometimes we gather them up to wipe our arse. But if you, Aryan whore, send your host to fight us again, your entire shabby horde will be jammed up a horse’s pussy. We have enough swamps to pave over with your corpses.

We have only one advice to you – go fuck yourself, Sir. Leave Russia before it’s too late – this is our serious word. If you do not leave on your own, we will feed you with shit until you are full. Goebbels and Ribbentrop will get a stake up their arse, and you will be first beaten up with a bat and then hanged on a cock. The rest of your gang we will just bury deep in the ground.

Thus our letter ends, and we wish you a swift death. Tell Ribbentrop to kiss your arse. Then tell Goebbels to stand doggy-style and kiss his ass yourself. Soon your Fascist brothel will collapse, and cocks like you will have no time for kisses.

Upon orders from the partisans,
Signed, Ivan.

Translated by MicroBalrog

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Where does “Nepryadva” flow?

Where does “Nepryadva” flow?
Viktor Rebriko, personal archive photos, Soldier of Fortune (Russia) #10, 1998 (Via Atrina, a section of Otvaga)

Translated by MicroBalrog

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To this very day “Nepryadva” remains a unique weapon.
*It is named after the river Nepryadva, flowing across Kulikovo Field, the field of Russian battle glory, and entering the Don there.

In January 1988, the Tula Design Bureau received a telegram. A grenade had exploded in the barrel of the ‘Duel’ grenade launcher, and a representative of the designer was requested to immediately report to the Baltic Fleet.

Immediately I envisioned terrible things – torn-apart guns, injured sailors, and the like. Of course, I knew that no launcher, no cannon can be designed to take an internal grenade explosion and it was not our fault, but I was still concerned. At that time I led the Anti-Saboteur Weapons Section, where ‘Duel’ and ‘Ogonyok’ launchers have been developed by Borisov and Stepunin – both men had already retired.

At the Kaliningrad train station I have met with the grenade developer – State Award laureate Suprunov and Dryzhak, a representative of the Navy.

At the proper (ammunition) department of the Fleet Headquarters we were told the accident occurred in July 1987, in Luanda (Angola). The ship had just returned and reported the accident, and we were telegrammed. There had, thankfully, been no victims.

In the morning we arrived in Baltiysk, rushing to the heavy tank landing ship. An ensign showed us a grenade launcher, its barrel visibly inflated and bent. We were also shown the torn hull from an RG-55 grenade’s engine. After inspecting the exhaust attachment point we found a clear sign of corrosion which caused the engine to tear itself apart and be ejected onto the deck.

The explosion occurred at night. The ensign noticed where hull fell and located it with matches. The grenade warhead flew overboard and detonated in the water. The exhaust was never found.

We heard many interesting things about the Angola deployment. THe sailors explained that South African frogmen already used charges to sabotage five ships – two of them ours (one of them, the “Donbass Comsomoletz” was even mentioned in the papers) and three from the GDR. But they did it “painlessly but annoyingly”, with small charges, to remind us who ruled the local waters.

The Luanda harbor was protected by Cuban divers, but there were many places along the shore for saboteurs to enter the water. At night the leader of Angola left for the Cuban camp 20 kilometers away from the city. When the darkness of African night descende on the city, South African agents, malcontents against the regime and simple robbers climbed out of their day-time hiding places. Through the entire night, gunfire and explosions rang in the city.

Our men put out all the lights to avoid attracting sniper fire. Along the perimeter of the deck, hand-grenade crates and ‘Duel’ rocket grenade packages were placed. All night long the sailors randomly threw hand-grenades off the deck, while ‘Duel’ gunners equally randomly fired rocket grenades at the far approaches to the shore, risking attracting a sniper bullet to the muzzle flash. Our ensign was risking his life when he lit matches to look for the grenade hull.

Laughably Simple and Funny to Tears

This practice explained everything. The only thing that was unclear was the origin of rust in a hermetically sealed grenade – especially as Suprunov quoted documents that stated all unsealed grenades had to be fired during one guard shift or training exercise, especially in tropical climate. Of course, this rule was sometimes broken.

After deploying to Angola, the ship received excess ammunition from a deporting North Sea Fleet ship. This included unsealed grenade packages. We couldn’t prove it, but now we had a general clue where the rust could come from.

After returning to Kaliningrad, to file a report at the fleet headquarters, I picked up some freshly-printed album, and I felt I was going insane. Just next to me Suprunov is decrying the thoughtless unsealing of grenades, and the book says – “Open the hermetic seal… unwrap the grenade… inspect contact rings… where the paint-lacquer layer is disturbed…. bursh… emaille…”

This was printed – and was a veritable sabotage manual – at a respectable Fleet unit. I hand the book to Suprunov and say: “Just look at this…” He looked on – and when he realized what it was he literally howled.

Later on we discovered that this manual was used to “inspect” several thousand grenades. All of them have been used during research to increase the durability of “Ogonyok”.

The Fierce Fire of “Ogonyok”

At that time the most common anti-saboteur weapon on ships was the aforementioned MRG-1 “Ogonyok” rocket launcher, deployed in 1976. This was made up of seven slightly dispersing barrels in 55mm, on a tall tripod, equipped with a horizontal and vertical aiming mechanism. On the deck, rapid-mounting locks have been made for the launcher. It was fired from shelter by means of a cable and a remote control.

When the target was located, a combat alarm would ring, and the crew, excepting the launcher gunners, would go into shelter. The launcher was aimed and loaded manually, and then fired from shelter. Fire, thunder, the electric ignition parts would be ejected and then the salvo would repeat. But “Ogonyok” was stationary. What if one needed to fire from a boat or from the shore?

Thus it was decided to mount one of the barrels on the “Ogonyok” in a single shoulder-fired launcher. Thus was born the ‘Duel’ – but it transpired that the freedom of movement thus granted was a dangerous thing – the exhaust could damage the ship, injure a man or, if the gunner stood in front of a wall, fling him overboard outright. Thus it was understood that the launcher would have to be of a closed type.

An Urgent Need

When we visited them in the Baltic, our friends in the Fleet did not know yet that, in July 1987 in Sebastopol, preliminary testing was already complete for a new, closed-breech anti-saboteur rocket launcher, TKB-0171 Nepryadva. State testing was scheduled for 1988.

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An over-an-under barrel configuration allowed us to make the Nepryadva fairly flat, comfortable to carry behind one’s back during the forced marches that were expected to form part of foot patrols on the shore.
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Pressing the locking lever unlocks the barrels, allowing one to move back the chamber and remove the spent charge containers or entire unused rockets from the barrels.

The development started in 1981, when we were issued an full R&D order. Already 1-2 years before we had an order to develop a rocket launcher that shared 90-95% of its parts with ‘Duel’ – effectively a closed-breech ‘duel’. A single desinger drew all this, an overall look sketch was sent to the ordering party and the general secretary of the design bureau, and the issue was closed.

At first we were ordered to develop and produce a 50mm rocket launcher and a twin-barreled 45mm rocket launcher. Of the two, only one could remain. I was appointed to the project, and various errors ensued. The first task included mounting the closed-breech barrel to the 1.5-meter tall, flimsy tube tripod for Ogonyok. I went to Moscow to discuss with with Suprunov, deisgner of the new grenade for Nepryadva. He said cheerfully we had no work to do – since a 55mm enclosed ‘Duel’ already was drawn and we only needed to rechamber it in 45mm and 50mm. I responded with a brief sketch that concluded that given the caliber and chamber pressure the first shot would flip the tripod over. A man firing an enclosed ‘Duel’ would either be thrown off his feet or forcibly made to sit down on his deck. It became clear we needed to do entirely new work.

In Spring of 1983 we produced the first samples of two types of grenade launchers – 50mm rocket launchers for firing up to 1500 meters and 45mm double-barreled launchers for firing up to 400 meters. Together with the ballistic launchers they’ve been shipped to Sevastopol. Only the ballistic launchers have been fired, and all work on the 50mm rocket grenade had been ceased. The sailors asked us to remove the combination direct-fire sight and carry handle. Not other requests were made and the process was put on a two-year hold.

Only in early 1985 did we receive an R&D order for ‘Nepryadva’. In May 1985 Minister Finogenov appointed me head designer for the launcher, and we approved the 45mm double-barreled launcher for development. At our Moscow Oblast branch, Suchkov was appointed to design the grenade.

While deciding on the details of the order an issue rose. What part was to protect the shooter’s face from powder gas breakthrough? This seems to be insane in a small arm – how is it accomplished in rifles, assault rifles, shotguns, pistols, machineguns, cannons, for the love of God? By using the cartridge of course, why invented anything else? But no! The lead design bureau pushed through another solution: “the body of the launcher”. Thus the design had to be made more complex, using more parts and making it more difficult to load and unload.

Design and manufacturing documents were developed for both the sample arms and various auxiliaries, like rubber mounts to fix the guns on battle station walls on other locations where a guard or any other sailor could rapidly unsnap the launcher and use it.

A minor detail, but…

A major problem turned out to be finding a place to place the sling attachment and figuring out the sling – although we thought that since we chose the AKM sling we’d be safe. Only a few years later, watching the TV show “I Serve The Motherland” I saw M.T. Kalashnikov explain how hard it was to find a proper place for the mounts and design the sling.

An over-an-under barrel configuration allowed us to make the Nepryadva fairly flat, comfortable to carry behind one’s back during the forced marches that were expected to form part of foot patrols on the shore. It was comfortable when we fixed the sling on mounts at the barrel end and the end of the rubber stock cover on axis passing through a center of gravity – and ten kilos was quite some weight!

But of course the breech moves when reloading. Thus, when shooting the sling had to be fixed elsewhere – to the barrel block, to allow firing from a sling. Thus this part of the belt is detachable. The other end of the sling had to have a small chain attached to it to avoid it covering your field of view when shooting.

What are you doing?

One of the grenade launchers was sent to Leningrad for testing to evaluate sound and recoil levels. The noise was quiet enough to avoid needing ear protection, while the recoil force was 45 joules – lower than the 59 joules design requirements. While this was higher than the norm of 35 joules, recoil was easy to bear due to the design of the round and the perforated rubber stock elements. Night-shooting at sea, which showed it had a light, non-blinding and non-demasking muzzle flash.

In preliminary (factory) testing Suchkov was the shooter. I was the loader, which allowed me to inspect the spent cartridges for hammer traces, and to see and hear everything standing a meter away from the gun. Later on I fired the gun myself, as did the Navy representatives on the commission.

It was very interesting to shoot it – which provided circumstantial evidence as to the high effectiveness of the grenade. When we opened a series of shots at angles of -75 to +45 degrees, the first near-vertical shot into the water was accompanied by a terrible noise, as if a loaded KAMAZ truck has rammed our diver-carrying vessel. An ensign leaped out onto the deck and shouted: “What are you doing?! You will tear up all the piping!” With a guilty look we moved to the stern and fired another shot “under the ship’s tail”. Once more a terrible noise, and a new ensign: “What are you doing?! You will dislodge all my seals!” At these seconds, a combat diver’s job did not appear at all attractive.


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For diver hunters

The main part of the DP-65 is a block two thin-walled, smooth barrels 600mm long, fixed in the breech and tied together with a sighting block at the middle and a yoke at the barrels. They are locked with a bolt equipped with a large rubber-padded stock. Under the barrels are mounted a foregrip and a pistol grip with a trigger and trigger guard. Above and at the left rides a square sight. Pressing the locking lever unlocks the barrel and enables the user to open the chamber, which allows one to remove unspent grenades by hand or allows empty cartridges (which are shorter) to fall out under gravity. Loading occurs in reverse order.

We already mentioned the existence of an HE and flare grenade. Before loading, the grenade is set to a shallow or deep detonation by twisting the protective cone, which is then removed (with it the grenade will not enter the barrel). Given that the grenade has a radius of underwater effect is 14 meters, it is easy to calculate that when the grenade is set to shallow detonation it is  sufficient to disable divers as deep as 28-30 meters, and at high depth it can reach 60 meters.

State testing at flare light

The state testing in Sebastopol, in October 1988, started with horrible weather. After several days of fruitless waiting our diver ship had to be repainted. And when our mission was scheduled for October 12th, we had to use a small flat-bottomed testing ship, which we shared with a Leningrad team with their own device. Technically, the “Nepryadva” could not be used at a sea state of over 4 degrees. Wheen we arrived at the testing point, some of the sailors insisted it was over 5, and the head of the State comission approved the testing.

Now it was not the various members of the commission, but five select sailors that did the shooting. They had a technical education, comprehended everything instantly, and only at first groaned meaningfully when they first put on the sling with the hefty launcher. Later on, after the stormy day when each of them fired practically a case of ammo from a bouncing deck and comission members asked them “Is it too heavy?” – they replied: “It’s all right!”

In a break in the shooting the Leningraders lowered some device overboard from a rope on one side of the ship, then began throwing explosives overboard from the other side. Eventually the rope got tangled in our propeller and the engine died. The waves tossed us so hard that unattached items in deep boxes on the upper shelves in the mess room started getting thrown out, like rocks out of a sling. The Captain’s mate – a senior ensign – appeared on the deck in a rubber suit, he was given a knife to carry on his belt and another one he took on his hand. Then they lowered him off the stern and into the water, where he began cutting the Leningraders’ rope. It took a lot of time, but eventually they raised him back up, spun up the engine, turned the ship into the waves and the shooting commenced anew.

Tactics of “Nepryadva” use suggested that, during an attack from the direction of open sea, one of the barrels would be loaded with a flare to mark the target location on the featureless water surface. After target information and fire orders were received, the signal round would be fired, and the burning red signal fair would rise to the surface. HE grenades would be fired at the flare with a few flares mixed in. The flares boiled excellently, even as they danced madly on the storm waves.

The testing was unrealistically cinematic. Big white-crested waves, “holes” between them into which our flat-bottomed boat “fell”, five sailors pressed to the railings and staircases with grenade launchers on slings – and above, on the bridge, the State Commission, struggling to look brave but clearly quite pale – and the Tula grenade launcher maker, Cherkzhanov, running into the belly of the ship and up again with cases full of grenades and clearly enjoying this struggle with Nature.

Ten Years – And Nothing

Later on, in Tula, when we received the state testing act, complete with colored cut-offs of the grenade and launcher, we read it with great interest – especially the conclusion of the Black Sea Commander, Admiral Khronopulo, to deploy our complex – but only in June 1990 did the MoD issue order #125 to accept grenade launcher DP-64 and its armament, and consider it and its ammunition unclassified.

On 07.12.1996, “Red Star” newspaper printed an article titled “A Double-Barreled Gun For Diver-Hunters” with a table of specs for the DP-64 and its ammo. A photo depicted one of our testing samples, ruled “resource exhausted” by committee. A twin of the gun from the same testing body was sent to the first Abu-Dhabi arms expo to include Russians – and never returned to our bureau. They didn’t seem to shoot it there but at least they told about it to specialists and visitors from all over the world – otherwise there wouldn’t be a point to sending it that far.

In July 1998 the incident in Angola was 11 years old. Nepryadva passed testing 10 years ago – but still the defense against combat divers consists of hand-grenades and nets. Perhaps somewhere there are still a few ‘Duels’ – they were manufactured in very small amounts – with all their drawbacks. DP-64 is not being mass-produced – and strange seems the newspaper phrase: “the grenade launcher is being produced at the state scientific-manufacturing plant ‘Bazalt’”

And what of us, the Central Design Bureau for Sporting and Hunting Arms? We are part of the Tula Design Bureau, and the new, luxuriously printed book published for its 70th anniversary, the DP-64 has an entire page to it..

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37mm Soviet Mortar/Shovel

RED ARMY CHIEF ADMINISTRATION OF ARTILLERY

MANUAL FOR USE OF 37MM MORTAR

USSR MILITARY PRESS

1942

Warrior of the Red Army, believe in power of your combat gear, remain calm in the hour of danger, never part with your weapon, fight the enemy to the last!

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

The 37mm mortar (figure 1) is a smoothbarreled, indirect fire weapon, designed as an individual infantry weapon for the destruction of enemy manpower and the suppression of enemy firing points.

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Figure 1: The 37mm mortar in its battle state

In its transportable state, the mortar is a shovel, with the barrel serving as the grip. In this state, depicted in figure 2, the mortar can be used for a variety of entrenchment and earth work, like an ordinary Infantry Shovel, Small (self-entrenchment, digging trenches, etc.).

When firing the mortar, the shovel blade forms a baseplate. It is made of armor steel impenetrable to bullets, which makes the shovel usable as a shield to protect against bullets and shrapnel.

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Figure 2: Using the 37mm mortar as a shovel

The mortar is to be transported in its belt holster. It fires fragmentation shells, carried in a special bandolier, worn around the soldier’s body with the help of suspenders.

The mortar is capable of firing to maximum distance of 250 meters and a minimum distance of 60 meters. Note that while it is possible to use the mortar at shorter range, doing that in open terrain is inadviseable due to the danger of harming one’s own troops with shrapnel.

The mortar weighs about 1.5 kilograms and allows a change of horizontal traverse without repositioning the baseplate of about 12 derees in each direction.

II. DESIGN OF THE MORTAR

The mortar, depicted in figure 3, is composed of the following 3 main parts: the barrel, the baseplate/shovel blade, and a monopod with a plug.

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Figure 3: Design of the 37mm mortar

The barrel serves to direct the flight of the shell during the shot. Its muzzle widens slightly to help loading. The barrel is firmly joined with the breech, which serves as the bottom of the barrel. Inside it is fixed the hammer, which impales the shell’s primer.

The rear side of the muzzle ends in a ball joint linking it permanently to the baseplate-shovel. A turning ring is also installed to transform the mortar to its transport state. A moving cloth cover is also installed on the barrel to prevent burns to the hands after extended firing.

The baseplate-shovel serves to provide the mortar with a base in the ground during firing, as well as to transfer the recoil forces into the soil. The monopod serves to provide the mortar with a base in the ground during firing, which improves stability and accuracy. During transport, the monopod is placed in the mortar’s barrel with the link directed towards the breach, and the plug sealing the barrel. The spring-link is used to link the monopod with the barrel before firing.

III. DESIGN OF THE BANDOLIER

The bandolier (figure 4) is a cloth belt with loops in which iron casings for the shells are installed. It has an iron hook and loop for fastening around the body and a suspender belt for preventing a donward movement. The mines are placed in the bandolier with their tails downwards, fixed in the bandolier with the casing ring below and a spring above. When properly placed in the casing, the shell’s fuse is not poking out from the upper side of the case.

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Figure 4: The Bandolier

When removing the shells from the casing, it must be pushed from below, with the soldier’s fingers pushing against the stabilizer find. One is not to push against the tail primer. As soon as the shell passes the spring and the fuse is visible, one may take it by the fuse and simply remove it from the casing.

IV MOVING THE MORTAR FROM TRANSPORT TO COMBAT STATE AND VICE VERSA

To deploy the mortar, one must:

1.Open its holster and remove the mortar.
2.Dig a baseplate emplacements tilted forward, at around 30 degrees, towards the target.
3.Take the mortar by the barrel in one hand, with the shovel blade upwards, with the rear side away from the shooter.
4.Use the other hand to turn the breech ring to the right (marked with an arrow on the ring) by half a turn.
5.Remove the barrel from the shovel blade.
6.Place the mortar into the firing position with the rear side (shovel blade upwards), and then rub the shovel blade into the position (moving it up and down).
7.Remove the monopod and its plug and install it onthe barrel.
8.Aim at the target and place the monopod in the ground. You are now ready to fire. The deployment can be done very rapidly if the soldier is appropriately trained.

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Figure 5: Transporting the mortar and its ammunition,

To move the mortar to its transport position, one must:

1.Remove the monopod and place it in the barrel, sealing it with the plug.
2.Remove the mortar from the position, folding it into its shovel form. One must take care that the parts fit correctly.
3.Turn the breech ring left, pulling on it to make certain of the fit (against the arrow).
4.Replace the mortar in its holster barrel down and close the holster as depicted in figure 5.

V. FIRING THE MORTAR

1. The 37mm mortar ay be fired at the following target:
a) Enemy personnel in open or closed positions (trenches, ditches, buildings, potholes, bushes, etc.)
cool.gif Crews of machineguns, mortars, cannon.
2. The firing position must be chosen in such a way as to provide opportunity for camouflage and cover from enemy rifle, submachinegun, and machinegun fire (in a foxhole, ditch, behind a rock, etc. See also figure 6).

3. Aiming the mortar is performed without te use of sights. As such one must remember the following: Maximum range is achieved at an angle of 45 degrees. At lower angles firing the mortar is not recommended, as frequent misfires will occur. One may reduce the range by increasing the angle over 45 degrees.

4.Elevation is adjusted by moving the monopod. The closer the monopod’s point of contact with the earth is to the mortar, the higher the angle, and vice versa.
5.

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Figure 6: The mortar in position,

5. During firing the mortar’s barrel must be constantly held with one’s left arm, with its elbow fixed in the ground for stability (figures 6-7).
6. Fire correction is to be performed according to results of the first shot – raise the angle if you overshot, reduce it if your rounds fell shorts. Traverse is accomplished by swiveling the mortar as needed.
7.The mortar can be fired from the prone and kneeling position. The prone position is the most comfortable (figure 7).
8.To fire the mortar, after the aiming one must remove the shell from the bandolier with one’s right hand, place it in the barrel, lowering it fins-first until it reaches its center section, and then one must let go of the mine and remove the hand downwards or to the side.
Loading the mortar is completely safe.

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Figure 7: Firing from the prone position,

9. Should a misfire occur the mortar must be carefully tilted – lift the breech with the right hand, and with the left, catch the shell as it exits the barrel. Do not let the shell hit the ground. Make sure the fuse head does not hit your hand when exiting the barrel.

If you have begun tilting the mortar and the shell is already moving towards the muzzle, one must never tilt the mortar back, because the shell may again impact the hammer, causing it to be fired.

10. The mortar may be fired without using the monopod. One can simply base one’s left elbow on the ground, wrap the barrel with one’s hand, and aim the gun as needed. This form of firing, as well as the one that uses the monopod, is highly effective.

11. Shooting usually does not cause malfunctions in the mortar. Should these malfunctions (ripping off of rivets on the baseplate or attachments, bending of the baseplate etc.), one must fix the mortar or send it to be fixed.

12. While firing the gun, make sure the mine does not hit cover (tree branches, etc.), because otherwise it will detonate without reaching the target.

VI. SHELL DESIGN

The 37mm mine arrives in the forces entirely assembled and ready for firing. (Figure 8.)

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Figure 8: The 37mm shell

The mine comprises of three main parts (figure 9)

1.The hull, filled with explosive.
2.The fuse, placed at the front of the hull.
3.The launch charge, placed in the stabilizer tube.

A fully ready shell must have:

1. The fuze completely inserted, but its membrane must not be pierced. Should the membrane be pierced, one may not use the mine – the fuse will fail, or the mine will detonate in the barrel.

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Figure 8: The 37mm shell in cut off projection

2. The firing charge must be fully inserted in the stabilizer. If it has not been fully inserted one must complete the insertion by pressing the sides of the cartridge bottom with one’s fingers. One must not press on the primer with one’s fingers, as this may cause the charge to ignite.

Oil must be removed from the mine before firing. It is prohibited to fire oiled mines – they may cause misfires or fall short of the target.

VII.CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MORTAR
The mortar’s barrel must be dried and cleaned of dust, sand, and oil. One may not use a dirt or oiled mortar, this may cause misfires or the shells falling short. One must clean the mortar after firing. For this purpose one should use the monopod, wrapping rags around the spring-link.

Translated by MicroBalrog

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Throwing technique for the light infantry shovel

Throwing technique for the light infantry shovel

Sometimes, in close combat, the need emerges to kill or injure you opponent with the light infantry shovel at a range of 5-7 meters. For this you must enter a left-sided combat stance, holding the shovel by the far third of the handle, with the blade pointing upwards and forward, and raise it behind your head, while turning your torso to the right. Then straighten the arm while turning your torso to the left, aim your shovel to the target and let go of it just as your arm straightens, and your shovel is aimed at the target, breathing out sharply. In this form of shovel-throwing, the most common mistake is to tilt the hand too far down, which causes the shovel to spin too much, reducing the likelihood of it striking blade first. Another mistake is moving the hand sideways, rather than upwards, when raising it for the blow. That would cause a miss.

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Another way to throw your entrenching tool is throwing it from concealment. It is used when one must strike the opponent by surprise. For this your left side should be turned towards the target. The right hand should hold the tip of the handle, with the shovel lowered along the body, blade down. For the throw one must tilt the torso suddenly to the left, and simultaneously, using a straight arm, throw the shovel over your head to the target. Its axis must be the same as that of your arm. The shovel is released at the moment of maximum tilt, with the shovel pointed to the target.

At distances of 10-12 meter you must throw the shovel so it spins twice.

Throwing the full-size sapper shovel

The full-sized shovel can also be used to engage the opponent. The BSL-110 can be used as a spear at range of 3-7 meters. For this purpose, assume the left-sided combat stand, folding the left arm before the chest. With the right hand, take the shovel near its blade and raise it to the right shoulder, blade forward. With the blade forward, take the shovel hand to the right, and then, pushing forward sharply with the right leg and turning forcefully with your torso to the forward-right, straighten your arm and throw the shovel like a spear. After the throw, body momentum causes the right leg to step forward.

Sometimes a shovel of any size can be used to stop a fleeing opponent by disabling his legs. In this case one uses the shovel as if one was playing gorodki – assume a left-sided combat stance, holding the shovel by the tip of the handle. Take the arm to the side and backwards while turning the torso to the right. Then, pushing with the right leg, throw towards the target from the side. Choose the amount of spins individually – remember the light shovel spins more!

Throwing the light infantry shovel from behind cover, from the prone position, and from a roll

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These throws are identical to knife throwing in training techniques. While shovels are more rarely used in combat as compared to knives. Still you should train in all types of shovel throws – they may save your life one “wonderful” day.

The same applies to different forms of ax throwing, especially to throwing an ax during jumps followed by rolls. Furthermore, each man has his own preferred weapons and throwing methods – but this does not exclude learning the rest of the broad arsenal of available combat techniques.

Translated by MicroBalrog

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